This journal article can be ordered from http: It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: Volume 33, issue Number 3 Abstract: The expansion of energy services is found to be a major factor in explaining economic growth in Sweden, especially before the second half of the 20th century. Help us Corrections Found an error or omission? Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies? 
| Uploader: | Vokora |
| Date Added: | 2 June 2011 |
| File Size: | 47.77 Mb |
| Operating Systems: | Windows NT/2000/XP/2003/2003/7/8/10 MacOS 10/X |
| Downloads: | 8432 |
| Price: | Free* [*Free Regsitration Required] |
Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors.
Found - Howard Stern 101 Shows -CF128K Wk 39-2012[WDM]
A theory of ratings inflation ," Journal of Monetary EconomicsElsevier, vol. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form. Is your work missing from RePEc? Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
The expansion of energy services is found to be a major factor in explaining economic growth in Sweden, especially before the second half of the 20th century.
The paper develops a game theoretical approach that considers 3/92012 as one of the most important aspects within the market. Bibliographic data for series maintained by David Williams.
Howard Stern Shows -CFK Wk [WDM]
Download full text from publisher File URL: If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers. The principal agent problem is one of the major issues of the credit rating agency market. Afterlabor-augmenting technological change becomes the dominant factor driving growth though energy still plays a role.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item.
Full references including those not matched with items on IDEAS More about this item Keywords credit rating agencies ; regulation ; reputation ; rating inflation ; rating shopping ; JEL classification: The case of insurers' ratings ," Journal of Financial EconomicsElsevier, vol. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about. For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: F0 search for similar items in EconPapers Date: You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: General contact details of provider: Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
After analysing the status quo two policy options are discussed on a game theoretical basis.
Christian Fahrholz The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. This paper presents an option for regulating the credit rating agency market more effectively.
The Credit Rating Market - Options for Appropriate Regulation
This allows to link your profile to this item. Help us Corrections Found an error or omission?
Therefore, the market competition should be affected positively, too. Volume 33, 39/20122 Number 3 Abstract: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies? This journal article can be ordered from http: The main result is that the incorporation of a mediator, which awards the contracts based on a lottery drawing, would help to solve conflicts of interests.
No comments:
Post a Comment